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Abstract 
 
Using the U.S. National Study of the Changing Workforce survey, we show that claims of racial and 
gender discrimination emerge less frequently in workplaces with established worker voice 
mechanisms. This result accords with the hypothesis that participation enhances perceptions of 
workplace fairness. We show that while having a supervisor of the same race or gender is 
associated with reduced discrimination claims, the role of voice tends to be larger when the race 
or gender of the supervisor is different from that of the worker. This suggests that voice may be 
particularly important in heterogeneous workplaces. 
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Claims of Employment Discrimination and Worker Voice 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Employment discrimination claims represent a substantial cost for many employers. The costs include large 
legal bills to defend discrimination claims, settlements, damage awards and negative reputational effects.  
Avoiding such costs explains why firms devote substantial resources trying to forestall discrimination 
claims.1  Human resource management mechanisms that successfully provide two-way communication 
may limit race and gender discrimination claims with the potential for significant cost savings.   
We join a long-standing literature by using direct individual survey data to explore the determinants 
of discrimination claims (e.g. Kuhn, 1987, 1990; Barbezat and Hughes, 1990; Heywood, 1992; Hampton 
and Heywood, 1993; Neumark and McLennan, 1995; Hallock, 1998; Antecol and Kuhn, 2001; Shields and 
Price, 2002; Robst et al. 2003; Banerjee, 2008; Antecol et al. 2009; Adams et al. 2014). Researchers rely 
on such survey data as the details in court records are not standardized and as the vast majority of 
employment discrimination cases are either dropped or settled, leaving no record. The self-reported claims 
of discrimination are seen as a necessary antecedent to seeking remedy and the pattern is viewed as 
illustrative of the sources of costly litigation. 
Our analysis builds on several decades of study of the role that employee voice and managerial 
responsiveness play in determining firm outcomes and employment relations. The firm outcomes studied 
are numerous and include improved performance of the firm, better labor relations and, critical for our 
purpose, a stronger shared sense of fairness. Thus, Bryson (2004) and Bryson et al. (2006) demonstrate that 
when worker voice is encouraged and managers are responsive, labor productivity is higher.  Similarly, 
Greenberg (2002) shows that voice in the development of an outcome enhances the perceived fairness in 
the workplace independent of the actual effects of its implementation. An organization that provides 
                                                 
1 We recognize that these costs are not the full social costs of discrimination but only those potentially borne by the 
employer.  Other costs include any uncompensated damage and court costs to victims and the social inefficiency 
associated with human resources improperly allocated. 
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knowledge to employees about procedures and listens to employee concerns is more likely to be perceived 
as fair even holding the outcome constant.   
The current paper melds the two issues examining worker voice mechanisms as a potential 
determinant of claims of discrimination.  Previous literature suggests that more developed voice 
mechanisms may help improve perceptions of fairness.  We argue this may lower claims of discrimination.  
Our empirical analysis provides a nuanced story.  We show that the effectiveness of worker voice in 
mitigating claims of discrimination depends crucially on the differences in the race and gender of the worker 
and supervisor.   
The next section motivates our analysis by discussing the importance of voice, the measurement of 
discrimination claims and previous research.  The third section describes our data and methodology. The 
fourth section presents our results and a series of robustness checks.  The fifth section concludes and 
suggests avenues for future research. 
 
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
The idea of voice is closely aligned with the canonical view of unions as detailed by Freeman and Medoff 
(1986) building on the work of Hirschman (1970).  This view claims that unions provide a mechanism 
through which workers can express discontent and suggest change.  Moreover, the independence of unions 
implies that workers anticipate that managers will “hear” what is said and be responsive with the potential 
to improve firm performance. Yet, critically, much of this dynamic need not be exclusive to union 
representation.  It might be thought of more broadly as mechanisms of “participation” that could be 
replicated, or even improved upon, without union representation (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2000).2  
Indeed, in their study of voice mechanisms and productivity, Bryson et al. (2006) show that the benefits of 
voice mechanisms are substantially larger in nonunion settings. Thus, managers are encouraged to develop 
a culture in which workers voice concerns and are willing to take charge in resolving problems (Adler-
                                                 
2 See Benson and Brown (2010) for a contrasting view that voice is enhanced when there is both union and nonunion 
forms of voice present. 
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Milstein et al. 2011).  This participation can benefit the technical "process" of production as well as generate 
a shared sense of fairness.  This has been the focus of increased research on nonunion forms of voice across 
a variety of disciplines (Kaufman, 2015). 
 Social psychologists emphasize that voice enhances the perception of fairness for a given outcome.  
In their confirmation of this, Lind et al. (1990: 952) state that “it has long been known that the opportunity 
to present information relevant to a decision enhances judgments of the fairness of the decision-making 
procedure.”  They go on to claim the “voice effect is probably the best documented phenomenon in 
procedural justice research.” While not all of this research relates directly to the workplace, it has been 
replicated in the workplace where perceptions of fairness vary with the extent of voice even with the 
outcome held constant (Greenberg, 2002).  More recently, Charlwood and Pollert (2014) examine employee 
grievances among a sample of low-wage, non-union workers. They conclude that where management has 
a policy of meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues, workers report fewer and less serious problems 
and greater satisfaction with outcomes, all else equal.  Indeed, the view that voice influences fairness is 
evident in those prescribing specific managerial responsibilities associated with ensuring a fair workplace. 
“These responsibilities include giving adequate consideration to employees' viewpoints, suppressing biases, 
applying decision-making criteria consistently, providing timely feedback, giving justification and being 
truthful in communication.” (Folger and Bies, 1989)  Important for us is that four of these six characteristics 
are clearly associated with the level and quality of communication between workers and managers, one of 
the main workplace characteristics that we can measure in our data. 
 We emphasize that one-way communication from workers is insufficient.  It must be, as suggested 
earlier, communication that workers feel will be discussed, carefully considered and potentially acted upon. 
Indeed, Turner and O'Sullivan (2013) provide evidence on this from a large non-union US multinational.  
They show that the majority of workers who voiced complaints or sought remediation for a problem felt 
the managerial response was unsatisfactory.  Moreover, they indicate that voicing complaints in this 
unresponsive environment is associated with moves toward union support by the workers involved.  Again, 
the critical point remains that workers must feel voice mechanisms in place are responsive. This makes any 
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simple listing by management of existing mechanisms of less relevance for our study.  Having a suggestion 
program for workers can only help generate voice and ultimately perceptions of fairness if workers view 
the mechanism in place as valuable for resolving issues.  This is the basis for our analysis which focuses 
on worker perceptions of such effectiveness.   
While this emphasis on worker perceptions is not unique, it can be contrasted with an alternative 
empirical approach focusing on earnings differentials by gender or race as important determinants of 
discrimination claims. This focus runs the risk of ignoring most legally constituted discrimination and has, 
in general, performed poorly in predicting discrimination claims as argued by Gerson (2007: 116).  He 
shows that the vast majority of employment discrimination claims are not about earnings but rather about 
job assignment, termination, promotion, harassment, climate and employment itself.  Indeed, even among 
earnings claims, intent and incidents of discriminatory treatment are regarded as more persuasive than 
statistical evidence on wage differentials (Antecol and Kuhn, 2000: 703).  To date there is only modest 
evidence that workers with larger residual earnings differences by race or gender are more likely to report 
discrimination (Kuhn, 1987, 1990; Barbezat and Hughes, 1990; Heywood, 1992; Banerjee, 2008; Adams 
et al. 2014).  We return to this issue in our empirical robustness section. We include such measures in our 
estimations and confirm they play little role. Thus, our study shares with Adams et al. (2014), a view that 
broad measures of managerial behavior and worker voice may be more important in determining claims of 
discrimination then are earnings differentials. 
Finally, we recognize that self-reported claims of race or gender discrimination are unlikely to 
perfectly align with the economic or legal definition.  Yet, this represents a strength rather than a weakness 
of our investigation. Cases that do not match the economics definition can still result in judgments for 
plaintiffs. Cases that do not match the legal definition can still result in enormous legal fees. Our objective 
is not to measure the determinants of a particular definition of discrimination but rather to examine the 
determinants of those who feel sufficiently aggrieved to claim they are discriminated against.  Claims are 
likely to be costly to the employer regardless of the merits of the case.  
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Thus, this paper fills key gaps in the literature. It focuses on self-reported claims of discrimination 
and highlights the role played by a broad conception of worker voice. It is the first to show the importance 
of these voice mechanisms and to emphasize their role in reducing discrimination claims when the 
supervisor is of a different race or gender.  When workers perceive successful voice, they are much less 
likely to claim race discrimination in the face of supervisor of a different race and are much less likely to 
claim gender discrimination in the face of a supervisor of a different gender.  The next section describes 
the data and empirical methods. 
 
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data for the analysis are taken from the 2002 wave of the National Study of the Changing Workforce 
(NSCW), a nationally representative survey of employed individuals in the US in 2002.3  This survey 
focuses on quality of work life, although it also contains detailed information on a wide variety of socio-
economic characteristics of workers, workplace characteristics, and importantly for this study, questions 
about discrimination at work.  All information provided on the workplace comes from worker self-reports. 
Our sample consists of all observations with complete data resulting in a sample size of 2410 workers. 
We utilize two questions on discrimination claims from the NSCW. The first asks workers “do you 
feel in any way discriminated against in your job because of race or national origin” – which, for simplicity, 
we refer to as ‘race discrimination’ - and the second asks the same question about discrimination due to 
gender.  In each case the possible answers are simply, “yes” or “no”.  We interpret the affirmative to reflect 
workers who claim to be subject to discrimination. We emphasize that these are broad questions that while 
limited to the job, do not identify the source of discrimination, and so may originate from the employer, 
coworker or customer.  Nor do they identify the type of discrimination: in pay, promotion or job assignment.  
                                                 
3 While somewhat dated, this is one of few surveys that has information on perceptions of discrimination by the 
worker, aspects of union and nonunion voice and the demographic characteristics of the worker’s supervisor.  
Regardless, the relationship of voice and discrimination described here should be independent of the time period.  The 
dataset is a nationally representative telephone sample of the US working population in 2002 sponsored by the 
Families and Work Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research think tank. More details can be found at: 
http://www.familiesandwork.org/national-study-for-the-changing-workforce/.  
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Despite being broad, they explicitly ask about discrimination on the job and are very similar to the questions 
used in prior work on determinants of discrimination claims.  If voice mechanisms have an influence, it 
seems likely to do so across the broad set of circumstances these questions identify. 
As shown in Table 1, approximately 6.0 percent of the overall sample, claim they are subject to 
race discrimination, with nonwhite workers much more likely to make the claim (13.8 percent) than white 
workers (3.6 percent), a statistically significant difference. Males make claims of race discrimination more 
often (8.2 percent) than females (3.8 percent), a difference that is also statistically significant.  The data 
indicate 8.5 percent of all workers claim gender discrimination with females significantly more likely to 
make a claim than males (11.6 compared to 5.5 percent).  There is no statistical difference in claims of 
gender discrimination by race.  Workers who share the race or gender of their supervisor are less likely to 
claim race or gender discrimination. Although we cannot test this in our data, one possible explanation 
might be that white or male supervisors tend to furnish minority or female workers worse performance 
evaluations, raises, promotion chances and/or job assignments (e.g. Elivra and Town, 2001; Castilla, 2008; 
Madden, 2012). One of the issues we examine is whether or not these differences isolated in the simple 
averages in Table 1 persist after controlling for a number of factors. 
We explore several proxies for voice, based on the recognition that successful voice requires 
managers to convey both information about the workplace and their openness to worker suggestions.4   The 
latter is typically associated with a willingness to listen and respond to concerns raised in a fair and 
supportive manner (Detert and Burris, 2007). The response by workers, in turn, should increase information 
provided to managers about the workplace (Detert and Trevino, 2010; Adler-Milstein et al. 2011). The 
ability to give voice to workplace issues has been identified with increased willingness to act to address 
issues because of the resulting increased sense of empowerment or autonomy (Adler-Milstein et al. 2011). 
                                                 
4 The very broad literature across academic disciplines leads to a number of ways of conceptualizing the dimensions 
of voice (see Dundon et al. 2004 and Kaufman 2015 for discussions of this), but the three measures available to us in 
the data are broadly aligned with previous research.  Just to name a couple of examples:  Kaufman (2015, p. 23) 
highlights the importance of communication, while Budd (2011, p. 67) and Lawler (1986, p. 3) suggest an important 
role for autonomy and information flows in voice, respectively. 
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Using this framework we identify the flow of information from workers to supervisors by utilizing 
a question that asks whether “My managers seek information/new ideas from employees”. Table 1, column 
3 documents that almost 73% either agree or strongly agree with the above statement.  There are only small 
differences by race and gender and only the latter shows any statistical difference.  Heterogeneity in 
supervisor race or sex also makes little difference in the provision of this kind of voice. 
The second measure of voice builds up from a series of four questions relating to communication 
and support provided by the supervisor. The first component relates to the information flow from the 
supervisor, “My supervisor keeps me informed of things I need to do the job well”.  The second and third 
components relate to the expectations and communication about success: “My supervisor has realistic 
expectations of my job performance” and “My supervisor recognizes when I do a good job”.  The final 
component focuses on the expectations of the worker about management's response to work problems, “My 
supervisor is supportive when I have a work problem”.  These variables are all coded using a 5-point Likert 
scale, and we use the first principle component of these responses to generate a binary variable (when the 
principle component exceeds zero) that indicates a high level of voice (“Communication and Support”).  
Table 1 indicates that approximately 63 percent experience high levels of supervisor communication and 
support, with only modest differences across demographic characteristics. 
 The final measure we examine is autonomy, or the ability to make one’s own decisions about work.  
Much of the rationale for managerial initiated voice is to empower workers to solve their own problems. 
Thus, voice should be associated with greater worker autonomy.  Here the specific question states, “I have 
the freedom to decide what I do on the job”.  Approximately 64 percent report that they agree or strongly 
agree with the above statement.  Yet for nonwhite (female) workers the equivalent fell to 55.2 (60.4) percent 
with statistically significant differences between genders and races.  Finally, a difference in supervisor and 
worker race is associated with lower autonomy. 
Given the cross-disciplinary nature of research on voice (Kaufman, 2015), no single indicator can 
hope to capture all of the distinct dimensions.  Nonetheless, by trying to control for all the above influences 
and by examining multiple measures, we hope to uncover the circumstances in which employees claim 
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discrimination and broadly identify the role of voice.5  We note that voice may influence claims of 
discrimination in a variety of ways which, unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between.  It may influence 
actual discrimination and be reflected in the reported claims of discrimination. Alternatively, voice may 
influence discrimination claims in the presence/absence of actual discrimination.  All of these influences 
will be reflected in the probability of making a discrimination claim which is the focus of our analysis. 
Whether or not a discrimination claim is made is thus a binary variable, and we estimate all 
specifications via probit.6  For ease of interpretation we convert the key probit coefficients into marginal 
effects (keeping all other covariates at their sample mean levels). When examining our critical binary 
indicators of voice, the marginal effects identify the influence of each indicator on the probability that 
workers make a discrimination claim.  All specifications contain controls for gender, race (nonwhite defined 
as black, Asian, Latino/a or other ethnicity), whether the supervisor and worker are of the same race (in the 
race discrimination regressions) or whether the supervisor and worker are of the same gender (in the gender 
discrimination regressions), union status, seven dummies for education, age, age squared, four dummies 
for region, eight dummies for occupation and four dummies for length of tenure at a firm.  The descriptive 
statistics for these covariates are presented in the Appendix Table 1 with a full set of descriptive statistics 
available from the authors.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Given that workers identify both the voice mechanisms and the discrimination claims there may be ‘common rater 
bias.’  This bias emerges when the answers to one question, depend upon the perceptions of another.  While not 
denying this potential, recent research by Conway and Lance (2010) suggests that such bias often does not exist in 
practice and may even be helpful.  Thus, one might argue that the identification of worker voice should come from 
workers rather than, say, managers.  Viewed this way, it is not the policies themselves that affect the claims of 
discrimination, but rather the perceptions of the success of voice policies that influence claims.  
 
6 We note that comparable logit estimates reveal essentially similar results for the key measures of voice and little is 
lost focusing on only the probit estimates. 
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4 RESULTS 
Next we turn to a series of regressions designed to estimate the partial correlations between each 
voice measure and discrimination claims.  We follow this with a series of robustness checks.  We initially 
present the basic results on race discrimination claims followed by sex discrimination claims. 
 
4.1 Race Discrimination Claims 
The top panel of Table 2 summarizes the basic econometric specification where almost all of the 
correlations (reported as marginal changes in the probability of a discrimination claim) are statistically 
significant.  The means from Table 1 suggest that nonwhites are well over ten percentage points more likely 
to claim racial discrimination.  After including the covariates, this falls to less than five percentage points. 
Workers are around five percentage points less likely to claim racial discrimination when their supervisor 
is of the same race. Critically, the role of the voice measures appears substantial when compared to these 
basic determinants.  Workers with supervisors who ask for ideas (“Seeking Information” column) are nearly 
six percentage points less likely to claim racial discrimination.  This is replicated for those workers who 
experience supportive communication (“Communication and Support” column) from their supervisor.  The 
correlation of autonomy and discrimination claims is in the same direction but appears smaller.  Thus, at a 
first cut, the variety of voice mechanisms appear to be clearly associated with a lower incidence of race 
discrimination claims. 
The impact of unionization on perceived discrimination is also reported in Table 2. A well-
established literature, championed by Freeman and Medoff (1982) and many others, argues that unions 
represent another form of voice.  In this particular context, Heywood (1992) finds that union members are 
more likely to claim discrimination regardless of their race and suggested that such complaints may be a 
form of union voice. Yet, the estimates in Table 2 provide only weak evidence and those in Table 4 (for 
sex discrimination) provide virtually no statistically significant influences of unionization on claims of 
discrimination.  The most critical point from our perspective is that the voice mechanisms we identify 
persist in importance after controlling for unionization and, indeed, appear equally effective in either 
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setting.7 The apparent lack of importance for unions may reflect that differences in the nature of voice 
between unionized and nonunionized employers is narrowing. Alternatively, unions may play some role in 
the creation of the mechanisms of voice but not in their success. While tangential to this paper, these remain 
interesting topics for future work. 
Table 1 documents the underlying probability of claiming discrimination is much higher when the 
worker/supervisor race differ (13.4 compared to 3.7 percent). Given this large influence of the supervisor’s 
race on the likelihood of a worker claiming discrimination, we explore whether the supervisor’s race also 
influences the correlation of the voice mechanisms in reducing those claims.  We split the sample into 
workers with a supervisor of the same/different race. The lower panels of Table 2 document results for each 
sub-sample. The voice measures continue to suggest lower claims of discrimination in both subsamples, 
although the point estimates differ substantially.  Thus, the ‘Seeking Information’ voice measure is 
associated with a 2.7 (16.4) percentage point smaller probability of a discrimination claim when the 
supervisor is of the same (different) race.   The other voice measures show similar patterns.  
We now examine the influence of the voice measures in more detail by identifying dummies for 
three separate groups of workers.  We keep nonwhite workers without voice as a base and then create 
dummy indicators for white workers with no voice, white workers with voice and nonwhite workers with 
voice.  These estimates are shown in Table 3 and provide measures of the influence of voice that differ by 
race. The estimates indicate that compared to the base (nonwhite workers with no voice) white workers 
without voice have a lower probability of making a discrimination claim.  However, comparing white 
workers with and without voice, we see in the fourth row, first column of the top panel, that white workers 
with managers seeking information are more than six percentage points less likely to claim discrimination 
than similar white workers without this form of voice.  For nonwhite workers, voice is associated with 
lower claims by nearly four percentage points.  Similar results are found for the other two measures of voice 
                                                 
7 In a robustness check suggested by a referee, we interact union status with our voice measures.  In seventeen of 
eighteen specifications there was not a statistically significant interaction. These results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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– communication and support and autonomy – with the decrease being larger for white workers compared 
to nonwhite workers. 
The bottom two panels again split the sample by the supervisor’s race.  When the supervisor and 
worker are of the same race, the negative correlations with the voice mechanisms remain for white workers 
with reductions of 6.6, 3.5 and 4.1 percentage points, respectively for the three voice measures. Yet, when 
the supervisor and worker are both nonwhite, no statistically significant difference (at 5 percent) can be 
identified for workers with and without voice.  Thus, the earlier suggestion that voice is associated with 
reduced discrimination claims even when the supervisor and worker are of the same race, is generated 
largely by white workers.  This can be contrasted with the case when the supervisor and worker are of 
different races.  Here, the voice mechanisms are associated with a slightly larger reduction in claims among 
nonwhite workers. This may seem a particularly relevant case, nonwhite workers with a white supervisor, 
and it is here that we find the largest association with voice.  This hints that voice measures may be 
particularly effective in reducing claims of discrimination in racially heterogeneous workplaces.   
Before examining sex discrimination claims and further robustness checks, it is worth remembering 
that the nonwhite group is an amalgam of black, Hispanic, Asian and other workers.  While some racial 
categories are relatively small in size, we have repeated the estimations retaining only blacks and whites 
and the relationship between voice and discrimination claims persists in this tighter comparison and exists 
for both white and black workers.  Moreover, the results continue to suggest that the association is, if 
anything, stronger for whites.  Indeed, if we separately run the regressions by white and non-white samples 
to allow for the most general specification which allows all coefficients to vary by race, we find that the 
coefficients on the three voice measures are -0.034, -0.028, -0.017 for white workers and -0.134, -0.172, -
0.008 for nonwhite workers, with all being statistically significant at the five percent level, except for the 
final coefficient estimate. 
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4.2 Sex Discrimination Claims  
 We now turn our focus to claims of gender discrimination and summarize the basic specification 
in the top panel of Table 4, again showing statistical significance for each variable at the one percent level.  
After controlling for covariates, the results return marginal effects that imply differences roughly half those 
from the means found in Table 1. Women are more likely (between 3.9 and 4.9 percentage points) to claim 
gender discrimination.  The coefficients on the voice measures are large (between 4.5 and 8.3 percentage 
points) and indicate that when supervisors seek the ideas of employees, gender discrimination claims are 
less likely.   
 As with the race discrimination results, sharing the same gender with the supervisor significantly 
affects the results.  In the top panel, workers of the same gender as their supervisor are over five percentage 
points less likely to claim discrimination, all else equal.  Not only does this largely mimic the results for 
the race of the supervisor but a similar pattern emerges when examining the connection between the voice 
mechanisms and the gender of the supervisor.  In the bottom two panels of the table, the estimates are run 
separately on the sample of workers who share/do not share the same gender as their supervisor. The results 
indicate that voice is associated with a larger reduction in discrimination claims when the supervisor and 
worker are of different genders (e.g. a 14.2 percentage point reduction compared to a 5.6 percentage point 
reduction for the ‘Seeking Information’ measure of voice), again suggesting the importance of voice in a 
heterogeneous workplace.   
 As above with race, we next estimate sex discrimination claims including interactions of sex and 
the voice measures, see Table 5.  Once again the results are nearly all statistically significant at the one 
percent level.  For the overall sample (top panel), males, ceteris paribus, are less likely to claim sex 
discrimination, with voice associated with 6.6 and 4.0 percentage point lower probability of a claim 
depending on the voice measure (see the ‘Test’ row).  Interestingly, this is about the same level of magnitude 
as voice for females, which ranges from -6.0 to -3.6 percentage points.  These results are, in contrast, to the 
role of voice among nonwhite workers discussed above, where voice had a much smaller correlation with 
discrimination claims among nonwhite workers compared to white workers.   
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 To check for robustness we estimate the regressions separately by gender (results available from 
the authors), the marginal correlations for females on the three voice measures are -0.095, -0.105 and -0.043 
while they are -0.049, -0.049 and -0.033 for the male sample, where all are statistically significant at the 
five percent level. 
We now split the sample by the sex of the supervisor compared to that of the worker in the bottom 
panels of Table 5.  As shown, when the supervisor shares the same sex as the worker, voice emerges with 
a small and not always significant correlation in reducing discrimination claims for women and continues 
to have a modest correlation for males.  On the other hand, when the sex of the supervisor differs from that 
of the worker, voice plays a far larger and statistically significant role. Thus, the first voice measure 
‘Seeking Information’, for example, is associated with a 14.9 percentage point reduction in the likelihood 
of a gender discrimination claim by a women and a 14.4 percentage point reduction for men, all else equal.  
Again, this may be a particularly relevant subsample, female workers with a male supervisor and vice versa 
for males, and it is here that the correlation between voice and discrimination is largest.     
Thus the results suggest an important role for voice in mitigating claims of both race and sex 
discrimination.  This is regardless of whether the claims are of race or gender discrimination. The 
correlations are more negative among workers who differ by gender/race from their supervisors suggesting 
the importance for voice in demographically heterogeneous workplaces.  In the next section, we investigate 
other possible explanations for the results presented to date. 
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
 Several additional sets of regressions examine the robustness of the results.  First, while the voice 
mechanisms in the previous regressions were entered individually, it may be the case that interrelationships 
between the three measures may complement each other.  Thus, rather than enter the voice measures 
individually as in Tables 2 and 4, we include a series of mutually exclusive dummy variables interacting 
the three voice proxies that capture different combinations of the voice measures, compared to workers 
with no voice.  Results of this exercise are in Table 6.  It is clear from the top part of the table, that having 
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only one voice measure has a limited effect on mitigating discrimination claims, while having measures 
seeking information and communication or all three measures result in large negative correlations with 
discrimination claims.  As above, when the supervisor is of a different race or sex (for race or sex 
discrimination, respectively), the voice measures have a much larger negative correlation, while there is 
relatively small effects when the supervisor’s race or sex is the same as the worker’s.  
Next, we examine the possibility of the general level of worker wellbeing acting as a confounding 
effect.  Thus, unhappy workers may both complain about managers and claim discrimination. We follow 
the previous literature and include a measure of subjective well-being as a covariate (Johnson and Neumark, 
1997).  Tables 7 and 8 report the race/sex-voice interacted models discussed previously including a measure 
of life satisfaction (a dummy variable indicating whether the worker reports to be satisfied with his/her life).  
In the overall sample, the correlation between life satisfaction and claims of discrimination work as 
anticipated with those being satisfied having a lower probability of claiming either race (Table 7) or sex 
(Table 8) discrimination.  We recognize that it is possible that perceptions of discrimination at work may 
generate low life satisfaction so we are wary of the direction of causation. 
The crucial point is that the general tenor of our results discussed above remain. Despite controlling 
for subjective well-being, the voice measures are associated with a lower probability of claiming 
discrimination. This association remains strongest among workers who have different sex and race than 
their supervisors for both types of discrimination.  The association between voice and discrimination claims 
does not seem to be generated simply by those workers unsatisfied with life. 
A second potential issue, discussed earlier, is the potential link between typical residual wage 
measures of discrimination adopted by economists and the potential influence on claims of discrimination.  
These differentials have been shown to predict earnings adequacy or satisfaction with earnings (Hampton 
and Heywood, 1993) but typically not discrimination claims. To check for robustness here we estimate log 
hourly wage equations separately for white and nonwhite workers (in the case of race discrimination) and 
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for male and female workers (in the case of sex discrimination).8  From those estimates we generate a wage 
differential that is the predicted white-nonwhite wage for nonwhite workers and the predicted nonwhite-
white wage for white workers and add this differential as an additional regressor in the racial discrimination 
claim specification.  Likewise, for the sex discrimination equation, we include a wage differential variable 
that is constructed as the predicted male-female wage for females and the predicted female-male wage for 
males. The differential generated in this way should imply that those with a smaller or more negative 
differential should be more likely to claim discrimination. Thus, we are testing the role of earnings 
differences as a determinant of claims but also viewing it as a potential omitted variable that might bias our 
estimates of the relationship between voice and claims. 
 Tables 9 and 10 record the results from this robustness test.  In keeping with the bulk of the 
literature, there seems to be no statistically significant relationship between the predicted wage differential 
and claims of either race or sex discrimination.  This is consistent with Gersen (2007) and others who 
suggest that wage differentials as measured by economists are not a good predictor of discrimination claims 
and far from the first thing that workers think of when identifying fair treatment. Given that our results also 
fail to find a role for wage differentials, it is perhaps not surprising that the voice-race/sex results remain, 
again, qualitatively similar.9  For nearly all cases, voice has a statistically significant, mitigating effect on 
claims of discrimination, particularly when the supervisor and worker are of different sex or race.    
 Finally, unions are often thought of being unique in their ability to provide voice to workers. While 
the evidence on this is mixed, as we discussed in the introduction, it is worth noting that we found no 
statistical differences in the role our key measures of voice played in the union and nonunion sectors.  While 
                                                 
8 The wage regression results are available from the authors, but they include standard regressors such as gender, race, 
supervisor sex and race, union status, education, age, age squared, years in the labor force, firm size, an hourly pay 
indicator, marital status, region and occupational controls. These are available upon request. 
 
9 Indeed, we attempted to generate critical levels of the differential that might indicate discrimination such as those 
more than one standard deviation above the mean.  Even such indicators played no role in claims of discrimination 
and left the voice associations in place. 
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some of the demographic and other determinants differ, worker perceptions of voice are related to similar 
reduced claims of discrimination for unionized and nonunionized workers.10 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The fundamental suggestion of this paper has been that manager initiated voice may reduce claims 
of employment discrimination on the basis of race and gender.  This follows from previous evidence that 
voice improves the functioning and productivity of the workplace and as suggested by social psychologists 
that voice changes perceptions of the workplace.  When workers feel their comments and suggestions will 
be met with a careful and reasoned response and the opportunity for continued dialogue, they see the 
workplace as exhibiting greater fairness.  We examine whether, as a consequence, workers are less likely 
to claim employment discrimination. 
The evidence we present shows a robust and durable statistical relationship between several 
measures of voice and lower claims of both race and sex discrimination.  While these relationships persist 
in most subsamples, the strongest associations of voice and claims become evident when there are 
differences in race or sex between the worker and the supervisor.  Thus, one of the major contributions of 
our inquiry is a more nuanced role of voice – that voice is particularly associated with lower claims of 
discrimination in situations where differences in race or sex occur.  We confirm that discrimination claims 
are less likely when the worker has a supervisor of the same race and sex.   
Critically, the relationship we identify does not flow simply from a minority of dissatisfied 
respondents claiming discrimination and that they do not have voice.  The relationships persist when 
controlling for subjective well-being.  Moreover, the relationships appear far more important than the 
economist's measure of earnings differentials.  The racial and sex earnings differentials have little or no 
explanatory power confirming results from the prior literature.  Controlling for subjective well-being and 
the size of the relevant wage differential do not eliminate the relationship between voice and claims of 
                                                 
10 These results are available from the authors and fit with our earlier evidence that once the voice mechanisms are 
included there exists no independent role for unionization to play in influencing discrimination claims. 
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discrimination. The reduction in claims of discrimination could result from a reduction in the extent of 
discrimination. This would obviously support the broad policy objective of equal opportunity. It could also 
result from a reduction in the probability of claiming discrimination even if it exists. This could work against 
those objectives.  Finally, it might result from a reduction in the probability of spurious claims of 
discrimination. Such a reduction could improve the efficiency of equal opportunities enforcement. All of 
these sources can be anticipated to reduce the associated legal costs of the firm. 
Future work may look for more detail on the specific mechanisms and characteristics of voice that 
appear successful.  More detail on everything from open door policies and suggestion schemes to 
autonomous work groups might help identify the specific forms of voice that influence the extent of 
discrimination claims.  Similarly, more detail on the type of discrimination claims could prove valuable.  
Does voice tend to be associated with reduced claims of discrimination in job assignment, promotion, 
termination or pay?  Further work investigating union voice and discrimination would also be an interesting 
further area of analysis as would a more complete model which could identify causal relationships.  Finally, 
linked worker and employer data could prove important to control for firm characteristics not in typical 
survey data of workers and which would be from sources other than the workers. 
Despite these potential avenues for improvement and more detail, this study suggests that the link 
between voice, participation and discrimination claims is, indeed, worthy of further study.  The costs of 
discrimination claims are enormous and the evidence that they are less frequent when mechanisms of voice 
are present argues that such mechanisms may both improve the work life of workers and pay for themselves 
in reduced litigation expenses. 
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Table 1.  The Distribution of Discrimination Claims 
 
Sample 
Race 
Discrimination 
Sex 
Discrimination 
Seeking 
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Number of  
observations 
Full 6.0% 8.5% 71.8% 63.3% 63.8% 2410 
Female 3.8 11.6 74.6 65.6 60.4 1421 
Male 8.2 a 5.5 a 69.2 a 61.1 a 67.1 a 989 
Nonwhite 13.8 8.6 72.3 63.0 55.2 510 
White 3.6 b 8.5 71.7 63.4 66.5 b 1900 
Superv. same race 3.7 8.7 72.1 63.7 66.0 1853 
Superv. different race 13.4 c 8.0 71.1 61.8 56.9 c 557 
Superv. same sex 6.6 6.1 72.5 62.3 62.9 1589 
Superv. different sex 4.6 13.9 d 70.4 65.5 65.7 821 
Notes:  Data from the 2002 NSCW.  All averages are weighted by sample weights. Superscripts indicate statistically significant differences (at the 
5% level) between genders (a), races (b), racial differences in supervisor (c), and sex differences in supervisor (d). 
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Table 2.  Selected Results from Race Discrimination Claims and Voice Regressions: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
Covariate Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   Voice Measure -0.057*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.056*** 
(-5.49) 
-0.018* 
(-1.68) 
   Nonwhite  0.046*** 
(3.04) 
0.043*** 
(2.85) 
0.044*** 
(2.78) 
   Superv. same race -0.049*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.047*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.42) 
   Union 0.015 
(1.45) 
0.017* 
(1.71) 
0.022* 
(1.84) 
    
Superv. same race sample   
   Voice Measure -0.027*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.017** 
(-2.33) 
-0.009 
(-1.20) 
   Nonwhite             0.055*** 
(3.46) 
0.052*** 
(3.26) 
0.051*** 
(3.09) 
   Union 0.009 
(1.10) 
0.012 
(1.36) 
0.012 
(1.32) 
    
Superv. different race sample   
   Voice Measure -0.164*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.203*** 
(-5.96) 
-0.062** 
(-1.97) 
   Nonwhite  0.057** 
(2.00) 
0.051* 
(1.86) 
0.062** 
(2.10) 
   Union 0.018 
(0.46) 
0.017 
(0.43) 
0.030 
(0.70) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%.  Other controls include 
gender, supervisor same race as worker (when applicable), union status, education, age, age squared, 
region, occupation, and tenure at firm.  Marginal effects are calculated using the mean values of other 
variables.  Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics.  All regressions are weighted using sample 
weights.  The sample average of perceived race discrimination is 0.060, 0.037 and 0.134 for the full, same 
race and different race samples, respectively. 
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Table 3.  Selected Results from Interactions of Race and Measures of Voice: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
Covariate Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   White novoice    
(WN) 
-0.032*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.019 
(-1.39) 
   White voice       
(WV) 
-0.099*** 
(-5.96) 
-0.091*** 
(-6.25) 
-0.051*** 
(-3.39) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.035*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.040*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.067*** 
[17.47] 
-0.052*** 
[12.47] 
-0.032** 
[6.28] 
    
Superv. same race sample   
   White novoice    
(WN) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.028*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.032** 
(-2.56) 
   White voice       
(WV) 
-0.091*** 
(-4.33) 
-0.063*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.073*** 
(-4.51) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.016* 
(-1.74) 
-0.014 
(-1.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.066** 
[8.99] 
-0.035* 
[3.79] 
-0.041** 
[4.75] 
    
Superv. different race sample   
   White novoice    
(WN) 
-0.035 
(-2.03) 
-0.044 
(-1.40) 
-0.050 
(-1.31) 
   White voice       
(WV) 
-0.145*** 
(-4.79) 
-0.146*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.102*** 
(-2.80) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.121*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.153*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.052 
(-1.46) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.110*** 
[11.48] 
-0.102*** 
[15.86] 
-0.052 
[2.17] 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%.  Other controls as in Table 
2.  Marginal effects are calculated using the mean values of other variables.  Numbers in parentheses are 
asymptotic z-statistics.  All regressions are weighted using sample weights.  The comparator group is a 
nonwhite worker with no voice.  The ‘Test’ rows refer to a Wald chi-squared test (DF=1) for the equality 
of the coefficients between white workers with voice (WV) and without voice (WN).  Numbers in these 
rows are the difference in marginal probabilities and numbers in brackets are the chi-squared test statistic. 
The sample average of perceived race discrimination is 0.060, 0.037 and 0.134 for the full, same race and 
different race samples, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Selected Results from Sex Discrimination Claims and Voice Regressions: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
Covariate Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   Voice Measure -0.083*** 
(-6.64) 
-0.082*** 
(-7.22) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.63) 
   Female  0.049*** 
(4.12) 
0.045*** 
(3.86) 
0.039*** 
(3.24) 
   Superv. same sex -0.051*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.054*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.77) 
   Union 0.008 
(0.52) 
0.009 
(0.66) 
0.008 
(0.52) 
    
Superv. same sex sample   
   Voice Measure -0.056*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.054*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.032** 
(-2.49) 
   Female 0.020* 
(1.73) 
0.018 
(1.54) 
0.012 
(1.00) 
   Union -0.003 
(-0.20) 
1.3E-4 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
    
Superv. different sex sample   
   Voice Measure -0.142*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.152*** 
(-5.90) 
-0.083*** 
(-3.05) 
   Female  0.095*** 
(3.50) 
0.087*** 
(3.38) 
0.082*** 
(3.05) 
   Union 0.034 
(0.97) 
0.034 
(1.03) 
0.034 
(0.97) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%.  Other controls include 
gender, supervisor same sex (when applicable), union status, race, education, age, age squared, region, 
occupation, and tenure at firm.  Marginal effects are calculated using the mean values of other variables.  
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics.  All regressions are weighted using sample weights.  
The sample average of perceived sex discrimination is 0.085, 0.061 and 0.139 for the full, supervisor 
same sex and supervisor different sex samples, respectively. 
 
26 
 
Table 5.  Interactions of Perceived Sex Discrimination and Measures of Voice: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
Covariate Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   Male novoice     
(MN) 
-0.034** 
(-2.38) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.031* 
(-1.88) 
   Male voice           
(MV) 
-0.100*** 
(-7.17) 
-0.095*** 
(-7.22) 
-0.071*** 
(-5.13) 
   Female voice -0.058*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.060*** 
(-5.57) 
-0.036*** 
(-2.85) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.066*** 
[19.15] 
-0.060*** 
[20.39] 
-0.040** 
[5.81] 
    
Superv. same sex sample   
   Male novoice     
(MN) 
0.007 
(0.43) 
-0.013 
(-0.94) 
-0.009 
(-0.50) 
   Male voice         
(MV) 
-0.055*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.058*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.039*** 
(-2.79) 
   Female voice -0.021 
(-1.58) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.024* 
(-1.82) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.062*** 
[18.14] 
-0.045*** 
[12.30] 
-0.030* 
[3.18] 
    
Superv. different sex sample   
   Male novoice     
(MN) 
-0.109*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.068** 
(-2.12) 
-0.050 
(-1.23) 
   Male voice           
(MV) 
-0.144*** 
(-5.36) 
-0.155*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.131*** 
(-4.27) 
   Female voice -0.149*** 
(-5.29) 
-0.123*** 
(-5.06) 
-0.062** 
(-2.23) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.035 
[1.17] 
-0.087*** 
[9.21] 
-0.081** 
[5.20] 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%.  Other controls as in Table 
5.  The comparator group is a female worker with no voice. The ‘Test’ rows refer to a Wald chi-squared 
test (DF=1) for the equality of the coefficients between male workers with voice (MV) and without voice 
(MN).  Numbers in these rows are the difference in marginal probabilities and numbers in brackets are the 
chi-squared test statistic.  The sample average of perceived sex discrimination is 0.085, 0.061 and 0.139 
for the full, supervisor same sex and supervisor different sex samples, respectively. 
 
 
  
27 
 
Table 6.  Fully Interacted Model of Voice on Discrimination Claims 
Voice measure(s) Race Discrimination Sex Discrimination 
Autonomy only -0.016 
(-1.45) 
0.008 
(0.37) 
Communication only -0.0270** 
(-2.41) 
-0.028 
(-1.30) 
Seeking info only -0.026** 
(-2.44) 
-0.024 
(-1.25) 
Seeking info + Autonomy -0.027*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.042*** 
(-3.12) 
Seeking info + Communication  -0.046*** 
(-5.45) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.94) 
Communication + Autonomy -0.027** 
(-2.22) 
-0.046*** 
(-2.90) 
Seeking info + Communication + 
Autonomy 
-0.061*** 
(-5.34) 
-0.096*** 
(-6.61) 
   
Supervisor Different   
Autonomy only -0.019 
(-0.44) 
0.015 
(0.33) 
Communication only -0.090*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.039 
(-0.76) 
Seeking info only -0.077** 
(-2.24) 
-0.046 
(-0.99) 
Seeking info + Autonomy -0.071** 
(-2.18) 
-0.068** 
(-2.02) 
Seeking info + Communication  -0.128*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.094*** 
(-2.90) 
Communication + Autonomy -0.091*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.088** 
(-2.55) 
Seeking info + Communication + 
Autonomy 
-0.197*** 
(-5.64) 
-0.176*** 
(-5.44) 
   
Supervisor Same   
Autonomy only -0.013* 
(-1.76) 
0.008 
(0.36) 
Communication only -0.011 
(-1.15) 
-0.023 
(-1.08) 
Seeking info only -0.013 
(-1.46) 
-0.009 
(-0.48) 
Seeking info + Autonomy -0.017** 
(-2.46) 
-0.032** 
(-2.36) 
Seeking info + Communication  -0.023*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.63) 
Communication + Autonomy -0.010 
(-1.02) 
-0.029 
(-1.62) 
Seeking info + Communication + 
Autonomy 
-0.028*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.062*** 
(-4.25) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%.  Other controls as in Tables 
2 and 4.  The comparator group is a worker with no voice.  
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Table 7.  Selected Results from Interactions of Race and Measures of Voice including Life Satisfaction in 
Claims of Race Discrimination Regressions: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
Covariate Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   White novoice 
(WN) 
-0.032*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.018 
(-1.36) 
   White voice      
(WV) 
-0.093*** 
(-5.80) 
-0.085*** 
(-6.08) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.21) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.034*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.93) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
   Life Satisfaction -0.018** 
(-2.26) 
-0.016** 
(-1.98) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.86) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.061*** 
[14.32] 
-0.064*** 
[10.32] 
-0.028** 
[5.23] 
    
Superv. same race sample   
   White novoice 
(WN) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.028*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.011 
(-0.98) 
   White voice     
(WV) 
-0.088*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.059*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.031** 
(-2.16) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.016* 
(-1.74) 
-0.013 
(-1.16) 
0.021 
(1.07) 
   Life Satisfaction -0.006 
(-1.04) 
-0.006 
(-1.00) 
-0.009 
(-1.42) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.063** 
[7.73] 
-0.031* 
[3.20] 
-0.020* 
[3.57] 
    
Superv. different race sample   
   White novoice 
(WN) 
-0.037 
(-0.93) 
-0.043 
(-1.40) 
-0.047 
(-1.22) 
   White voice     
(WV) 
-0.138*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.140*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.093** 
(-2.54) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.116*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.148*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.044 
(-1.25) 
   Life Satisfaction -0.050* 
(-1.74) 
-0.039 
(-1.47) 
-0.066** 
(-2.30) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.101*** 
[9.19] 
-0.097*** 
[14.39] 
-0.046 
[1.68] 
Notes: Same as Table 3. 
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Table 8.  Selected Results from Interactions of Sex and Measures of Voice including Life Satisfaction in 
Claims of Sex Discrimination Regressions: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
Covariate Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   Male novoice 
(MN) 
-0.033** 
(-2.34) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.031* 
(-1.94) 
   Male voice     
(MV) 
-0.094*** 
(-6.75) 
-0.089*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.067*** 
(-4.88) 
   Female voice -0.053*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.056*** 
(-5.16) 
-0.032** 
(-2.58) 
   Life Satisfaction -0.033*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.00) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.061*** 
[16.05] 
-0.054*** 
[16.62] 
-0.036** 
[4.65] 
    
Superv. same sex sample   
   Male novoice 
(MN) 
0.008 
(0.45) 
-0.013 
(-0.97) 
-0.010 
(-0.60) 
   Male voice    
(MV) 
-0.051*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.036*** 
(-2.64) 
   Female voice -0.018 
(-1.36) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.023* 
(-1.78) 
   Life Satisfaction -0.021** 
(-2.14) 
-0.017* 
(-1.73) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.61) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.059*** 
[15.72] 
-0.040*** 
[10.05] 
-0.026 
[2.48] 
    
Superv. different sex sample   
   Male novoice 
(MN) 
-0.108*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.069** 
(-2.20) 
-0.052 
(-1.30) 
   Male voice    
(MV) 
-0.137*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.151*** 
(-5.57) 
-0.126*** 
(-4.19) 
   Female voice -0.136*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.114*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.052* 
(-1.90) 
   Life Satisfaction -0.062*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.062*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.073*** 
(-3.14) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.029 
[0.66] 
-0.082*** 
[8.23] 
-0.074** 
[4.46] 
Notes:  Same as in Table 5. 
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Table 9.  Selected Results from Interactions of Race and Measures of Voice including Predicted Wage 
Differential in Claims of Race Discrimination Regressions: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
 
Covariate 
Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   White novoice  
(WN) 
-0.032*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.019 
(-1.40) 
   White voice       
(WV) 
-0.099*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.091*** 
(-6.33) 
-0.051*** 
(-3.41) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.035*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
   Wage Differential 0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
-0.0004 
(-0.02) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.067*** 
[17.49] 
-0.052*** 
[12.43] 
-0.035** 
[6.22] 
    
Superv. same race sample   
   White novoice    
(WN) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.013 
(-1.24) 
   White voice       
(WV) 
-0.095*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.070*** 
(-4.33) 
-0.037** 
(-2.42) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.016* 
(-1.69) 
-0.014 
(-1.37) 
0.023 
(1.12) 
   Wage Differential -0.008 
(-0.58) 
-0.013 
(-0.93) 
-0.016 
(-1.05) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.069*** 
[8.97] 
-0.039* 
[3.68] 
-0.024** 
[4.14] 
    
Superv. different race sample   
   White novoice   
(WN) 
-0.043 
(-1.05) 
-0.050 
(-1.55) 
-0.059 
(-1.49) 
   White voice       
(WV) 
-0.154*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.150*** 
(-5.36) 
-0.109*** 
(-2.87) 
   Nonwhite voice -0.116*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.151*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.049 
(-1.39) 
   Wage Differential 0.070 
(1.22) 
0.046 
(0.83) 
0.058 
(0.99) 
Test: WV-WN=0 -0.111*** 
[12.41] 
-0.010*** 
[16.35] 
-0.050 
[2.17] 
Notes:  Same as Table 3. 
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Table 10.  Selected Results from Interactions of Sex and Measures of Voice including Predicted Wage 
Differential in Claims of Sex Discrimination Regressions: Marginal Effects 
 Voice Measure 
 
Covariate 
Seeking  
Information 
Communication 
and Support 
 
Autonomy 
Full Sample    
   Male novoice     
(MN) 
-0.042** 
(-2.33) 
-0.043** 
(-2.37) 
-0.040** 
(-2.13) 
   Male voice           
(MV) 
-0.109*** 
(-6.25) 
-0.102*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.083*** 
(-4.27) 
   Female voice -0.058*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.060*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.81) 
   Wage Differential -0.020 
(-0.88) 
-0.018 
(-0.80) 
-0.025 
(-1.10) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.067*** 
[19.31] 
-0.059*** 
[20.23] 
-0.043** 
[6.22] 
    
Superv. same sex sample   
   Male novoice     
(MN) 
-0.0004 
(-0.02) 
-0.019 
(-0.85) 
-0.016 
(-0.69) 
   Male voice           
(MV) 
-0.063*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.047* 
(-1.94) 
   Female voice -0.021 
(-1.56) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.024* 
(-1.78) 
   Wage Differential -0.010 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
-0.012 
(-0.45) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.063*** 
[18.41] 
-0.045*** 
[12.62] 
-0.031* 
[3.23] 
    
Superv. different sex sample   
   Male novoice     
(MN) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.075** 
(-2.12) 
-0.059 
(-1.46) 
   Male voice           
(MV) 
-0.149*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.158*** 
(-5.38) 
-0.139*** 
(-4.07) 
   Female voice -0.148*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.123*** 
(-5.06) 
-0.060** 
(-2.17) 
   Wage Differential -0.043 
(-0.71) 
-0.030 
(-0.51) 
-0.052 
(-0.88) 
Test: MV-MN=0 -0.034 
[1.00] 
-0.083*** 
[8.97] 
-0.080** 
[5.32] 
Notes:  Same as in Table 5. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Full Female Male White  Nonwhite 
Race Discrimination 6.0% 3.8% 8.1% 3.6% 13.8% 
Sex Discrimination 8.5 11.6 5.4 8.4 8.6 
Nonwhite 23.4 22.3 24.4 0 100 
Female 48.9 100 0 49.6 46.6 
Union member 17.8 15.5 20.0 17.3 19.6 
< High School diploma 10.2 7.3 12.8 7.1 20.1 
High School diploma 30.4 29.5 31.3 30.6 30.0 
Some college, no degree 20.8 21.5 20.2 20.4 22.1 
Associates degree 9.4 9.8 9.0 10.1 7.2 
University degree 20.0 22.8 17.3 21.7 14.2 
Postgraduate degree 9.2 9.1 9.4 10.1 6.4 
Age 41.1 
(12.7) 
42.2 
(12.8) 
40.0 
(12.5) 
42.0 
(12.7) 
38.1 
(12.2) 
Age squared 1851.3 
(1090.4) 
1947.7 
(1124.8) 
1759.0 
(1048.6) 
1928.3 
(1109.5) 
1599.1 
(985.2) 
Managerial occ 14.2 15.5 13.0 14.8 12.3 
Professional occ 19.8 24.0 15.8 21.8 13.2 
Technical occ 4.1 4.6 3.6 4.4 3.2 
Sales occ 9.1 10.8 7.4 9.4 8.0 
Admin Support occ 14.0 21.2 7.2 13.8 14.9 
Service occ 12.4 13.6 11.2 11.4 15.5 
Production/operation occ 26.4 10.3 41.8 24.4 32.9 
Tenure<12 years 25.7 26.7 24.8 22.0 38.1 
Tenure b/t 12-21 years 25.3 24.6 25.9 24.9 26.6 
Tenure b/t 22-30 years 26.3 29.1 23.7 28.4 19.4 
Tenure >30 years 22.7 19.6 25.6 24.7 15.9 
Notes:  Data are weighted averages from the 2002 NSCW.  Numbers in parentheses are standard 
deviations of continuous variables. 
 
